{"product_id":"the-politics-of-repression-under-dag-tanneberg-9783030354763","title":"The Politics of Repression Under Authoritarian Rule: How Steadfast Is the Iron Throne?","description":"\u003cp\u003e1 Introduction \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.1 The Puzzle \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.2 The Argument in a Nutshell \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.3 Plan of the Book \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2 Toward a Theory of Political Repression \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.1 Introduction \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2 Why is Political Repression Important to Authoritarian Rule? \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3 What the Punishment Puzzle Says About Political Repression \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4 Reconceptualizing Repression: Restrictions and Violence \u003c\/p\u003e 2.5 How Do Restrictions and Violence Connect?  \u003cp\u003e2.6 Conclusion \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3 How to Measure Dictatorship, Dissent, and Political Repression\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.1 Introduction \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2 What Counts as Authoritarian Rule? \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3 Recognizing Dissent Under Authoritarian Rule \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4 How to Measure Political Repression \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4.1 Problems in Measuring Political Repression \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4.2 Operationalization of Violence and Restrictions \u003c\/p\u003e 3.4.3 Debating Important Reservations  \u003cp\u003e3.5 Conclusion \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6 Appendix \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6.1 Authoritarian Spells, Campaigns, and Repression \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6.2 Summary of More Flexible Lag Structures \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6.3 Uncertainty About Violence by Level of Restrictions \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4. Does Repression Prevent Successful Campaigns? \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.1 Introduction \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.2 Taking Stock of Campaigns \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3 How Repression Impedes Campaigns \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4 Design and Data \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4.1 Hints to Sample Selection Bias \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4.2 How to Correct for Sample Selection Bias \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4.3 Data \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5 Results \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5.1 Exploratory Findings \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5.2 Statistical Analysis \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5.3 Robustness Tests \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.6 Discussion \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.7 Conclusion \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.8 Appendix \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.8.1 Summary Statistics \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.8.2 Difference-In-Means by Campaign Status \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.8.3 Marginal Effects Accounting for Sample Selection Bias \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.8.4 Results for a Graded Measurement of Campaign Success \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.8.5 Results for Unique Observations \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.8.6 Bootstrap Results \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5 Does Repression of Campaigns Trigger Coups d'ﾉtat? \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.1 Introduction \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2 What's in a Coup d'ﾉtat? \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3 How Repression Discourages Coups in the Shadow of Campaigns \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4 Design and Data \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4.1 A Bayesian Multilevel Framework for Analysis \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4.2 Data \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5 Results \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5.1 Statistical Analysis \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5.2 Robustness \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.6 Discussion \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.7 Conclusion \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8 Appendix \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8.1 Summary Statistics \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8.2 Summary of Within- and Between-Differences \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8.3 Results for a Fully Specified Interaction Term \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8.4 Results for an Alternative Coding of the Coup d'ﾉtat \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8.5 Fixed Effects Estimation Results \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8.6 Cross-Classified Bayesian Multilevel Analysis \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 Conclusion \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.1 Introduction \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2 Summary of the Book \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.3 Main Findings \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.4 Added Value and Limits of the Analytical Framework \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.5 Avenues for Future Research \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.6 Conclusion \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eAuthor:\u003c\/b\u003e Dag Tanneberg\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eISBN-10:\u003c\/b\u003e 3030354768\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eISBN-13:\u003c\/b\u003e 9783030354763\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003ePublisher:\u003c\/b\u003e Springer\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eLanguage:\u003c\/b\u003e English\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003ePublished:\u003c\/b\u003e 01\/30\/2020\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003ePages:\u003c\/b\u003e 176\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eFormat:\u003c\/b\u003e Hardcover\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eWeight:\u003c\/b\u003e 0.99lbs\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eSize:\u003c\/b\u003e 9.21h x 6.14w x 0.50d","brand":"Dag Tanneberg","offers":[{"title":"Hardcover","offer_id":45482010738943,"sku":"9783030354763","price":129.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0662\/2982\/9887\/files\/img_b987a767-9290-4dfd-8fcb-74b953f10c06.jpg?v=1715988316","url":"https:\/\/www.whiterainbookhouse.com\/products\/the-politics-of-repression-under-dag-tanneberg-9783030354763","provider":"WR Book House","version":"1.0","type":"link"}