An Anticipative Feedback Solution for the Infinite-Horizon, Linear-Quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg Game (Paperback) (ISBN-13: 9781288632282)

This paper derives and illustrates a new suboptimal-consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game. This solution lies in the same solution space as the infinite-horizon, dynamic-programming, feedback solution but puts the leader in a preferred equilibrium position. The idea comes from Kydland (1977) who suggested deriving a consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game by varying the coefficients in the player's linear constant-coefficient decision rules. Here feedback is understood in the sense of setting a current control vector as a function of a predetermined state vector. The proposed solution is derived for discrete- and continuous-time games and is called the anticipative feedback solution. The solution is illustrated with a numerical example of a duopoly model

Author: Baoline Chen,Peter A. Zadrozny
ISBN-10: 1288632282
ISBN-13: 9781288632282
Publisher: Bibliogov
Language: English
Published: 01/21/2013
Pages: 34
Format: Paperback
Weight: 0.18lbs
Size: 9.69h x 7.44w x 0.07d