BHRM Chapter 11: Dynamic Navigation in Pilotage Water (Paperback) (ISBN-13: 9798183821543)

In studies of the human element, real collision avoidance scenarios often generate excessive mental and physical pressure, which can overload our memory structure. As a result, important information may be lost for experienced mariners, while those with less experience may struggle to retain new information.

Regarding instructor briefings before the exercises, some captains can recall the instructions well, while others cannot. During the exercises, some instructors prefer a hands-off approach, while others intervene at the first sign of error. Personally, I fall into the latter category; I believe in stopping the exercise when necessary to gather all bridge personnel and discuss what went wrong and how we can improve the situation. I recognize that humans operate with limited short-term and long-term memory regarding procedures. This limitation raises questions about how some individuals ascend to the rank of Captain. If they lack the correct long-term procedures, any information they absorb from briefings or lectures will likely remain unreliable, as it may only reside in their short-term memory.

"Steering was never physically lost. Rather, it had been shifted to a different control station, and the watchstanders failed to recognize this configuration. Compounding the issue, the steering control transfer to the Lee Helmcaused the rudder to go amidships (centerline). Since the Helmsman had been steering with 1-4 degrees of right rudder to maintain course before the transfer, the amidships rudder caused the ship's course to deviate to the left. Additionally, when the Helmsman reported the loss of steering, the Commanding Officer slowed the ship to 10 knots and eventually to 5 knots. However, the Lee Helmsman reduced the speed of only the port shaft, as the throttles were not coupled together (ganged). The starboard shaft continued at 20 knots for another 68 seconds before its speed was also reduced. This combination of incorrect rudder direction and the two shafts operating independently led to an uncommanded turn to the left (port) into a heavily congested traffic area, in close proximity to three ships, including the ALNIC.

Often, our eyes may see something, but we may not understand its significance-an example of this is the Sanchi case illustrated in Figure 3-1, which depicts the navigational track of SANCHI and CF CRYSTAL. Conversely, we may also overlook impending dangers, as seen in the Ever Smart case shown in Figure 7-09, which depicts the two minutes preceding a collision.

To achieve correct situational awareness, we need proper training that focuses on:

• Verifying statements to enhance our attention in short-term memory.

• Practicing skills to develop our long-term contextual memory.

• Following correct sequences to cultivate our long-term procedural memory.

• Collision Point Risk: This is the point at which the course lines of two vessels intersect, represented by the yellow circle in the diagram. A collision point riskdoes not imply a collision has occurred; we must verify its location in their collision line.

• Collision Line Risk: The line of two Ship's 3 minutes speed vectorcrossing each other like the vessels in Figure 2-15. 3 minutes is the time needed for course altering. Speed vectorcrossed in this time frame means collision will easily occur due to steering difficulties. In another words, two vessels arrive same collision point within 3 minutes difference deems collision risk exist.

• Collision Area Risk: This encompasses the area where the speed vectors of multiple ships overlap in the last three minutes